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        "caption": "argued above that Modified High and Low Stakes cases are explicit renditions reflecting how bank cases are interpreted by philosophers. But I could be wrong about this sociological fact. It's not essential to the main point of this chapter. What is of greater philosophical significance is whether (a) ordinary people really ascribe knowledge differently across the Modified High and Low Stakes cases and whether (b) the Modified High and Low cases only differ only in pragmatic factors or stakes (which one exactly will be important). I will show (a) in the next section. But I now discuss (b).",
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        "caption": "(a) Bob knows that the bank will be open on Saturday. (b) Bob thinks he knows that the bank will be open on Saturday, but he doesn't actually know the bank will be open on Saturday.",
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